initial scaffold
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docs/Caddyfile.example
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docs/Caddyfile.example
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# Add these blocks to the Caddyfile your Podman Caddy container already
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# loads (alongside the existing git.boglabob.com block for Forgejo).
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# Replace the node IPs with your actual k3s node IPs from `tofu output
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# node_ips` (10.20.30.0/24 by default).
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#
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# These IPs are on the private libvirt network the VMs live on (see
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# terraform/variables.tf's network_cidr), only directly routable from the
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# T630 itself — but since Caddy also runs on the T630 (Podman), it reaches
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# them the same way any other process on the host would: no extra network
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# config needed here.
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#
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# podinfo/hello sit behind Traefik's ServiceLB, which listens on port 80 of
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# every k3s node and routes by the Host header — so Caddy just needs to
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# forward the request (Host header included) to any node. Listing all three
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# gives you free load-balancing/failover across nodes.
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#
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# Deliberately NOT here: the Kubernetes Dashboard and the k3s API server.
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# Both grant cluster-admin-level control, and routing either through a
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# public-facing reverse proxy is the exact pattern behind real-world
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# cluster breaches (e.g. Tesla, 2018 — an exposed, unauthenticated
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# Dashboard). Both stay LAN-only / on-demand instead — see docs/SETUP.md
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# steps 12-13.
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podinfo.boglabob.com {
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reverse_proxy http://10.20.30.11:80 http://10.20.30.12:80 http://10.20.30.13:80
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}
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hello.boglabob.com {
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reverse_proxy http://10.20.30.11:80 http://10.20.30.12:80 http://10.20.30.13:80
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}
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